Philosophical Investigations 350-400

Needless to say, this portion was amazing. I underlined a lot, frequently entire sections, and am left with plenty to contemplate.

352. The law of excluded middle says here: It must either look like this, or like that. So it really--and this is a truism--says nothing at all, but gives us a picture.

355. The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie, but that we understand their language.

357. We do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself. Is that because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul? Well, one might say this: If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its soul.--But do I also say in my own case that I am saying something to myself, because I am behaving in such-and-such a way?--I do not say it grom observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I do behave in this way.--Then it is not because I mean it that it makes sense?
[Different criteria for establishing my pain, than assuming another's. The two conclusions have been reached by entirely different criteria or evidence.]

358. But isn't it our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence? (And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words.) And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private! It is the intangible something; only comparable to consciousness itself.
How could this seem ludicrous? It is, as it were, a dream of our language.

363. I should like to say: you regard too much as a matter of course that one can tell anything to anyone.

366. Is a sum in the head less real that a sum on paper?--Perhaps one is inclined to say some such thing; but one can get oneself to think the opposite as well by telling oneself: paper, ink, etc. are only logical constructions out of our sense-data.
"I have done multiplication.....in my head"--do I perhaps not believe such a statement?--But was it really a multiplication? It was not merely 'a' multiplication, but this one--in the head. This is the point at which I go wrong. For now I want to say: it was some mental process corresponding to the multiplication on paper. So it would makes sense to say: "This process in the mind corresponds to this process on paper." And it would then make sense to talk of a method of projection according to which the image of the sign was a representation of the sign itself.

367. The mental picture is teh picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines.

371. Essence is expressed by grammar.

372. Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arvitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."

373. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)
[Not sure what to make of this one which is why I marked it. Any brilliant ideas?]

383. Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft of such a description.

386. The difficulty is not that I doubt whether I really imagined anything red. But it is this: that we should be able, just like that, to point out or describe the colour we have imagined, that the projection of the image into reality presenets no difficulty at all.

389. "The image must be more like its object than any picture. [Distinguish between image and picture.] For, however like I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well. But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and of nothing else." Thus one might come to regard the image as a super-likeness. [Let's count how many times L.W. emphasizes "this".]

398. The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. [So much great stuff about the visual, images, pictures, in this section (350-400). Gold mine for a student of visual studies and literature, like my potential self.]

400. The 'visual room' seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a new way of speaking, a new comparison; it might even be called a new sensation.