Philosophical Investigations 300-350

301. An image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it.

304. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts.

307. 'Are you [Wittgenstein] not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at the bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?'--If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.

309. What is your aim in philosophy?--To shew the fly the way out of the bottle.

316. In order to get clear about the meaning of the word "think" we watch ourselves while we think; what we observe will be what the word means!--But this concept is not used like that. (It would be as if without knowing how to play chess, I were to try and make out what the word "mate" meant by close ovbservation of the last move of some game of chess.)

329. When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition the the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.

339. Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from speaking.....An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion.

340. One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.

343. The words with which I express my memory are my memory-reaction.

347. "But at least I know from my own case what it means 'to say things to oneself'. And if I were deprived of the organs of speech, I could still talk to myself."
If I know it only from my own case, then I know only what I call that, not what anyone else does.